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T H E  LIABILITY O F  A CA RRIER BY SEA
At the beginning of the twentieth century the bill of tailing had 
become one of the valuable instruments in commercial circles. Its 
importance had been created bv the custom of the M erchants and statu­
tory enactments which declared that the bill represented title to the 
property of the goods in transit. Whoever held the bill of lading 
liad the power to demand and the right to rcccivc the goods therein 
represented, subject to whatever equities may have attached, when the 
goods reached their destination. T he bill of lading was, however, 
subject to express, implied and statutory conditions. Hue to these 
conditions the holder of the bill of lading would often find that when 
loss or damangc occurred to his cargo the carrier or shipowner had 
absolute immunity for which he had expressly contracted. The ob­
vious answer was that the holder should have acquainted himself with 
the provisions in the bill before accepting. However this was not always 
practical in commercial circles where time was usually pressing and 
transactions quick. In reality the only answer was legislation which 
would set out the minimum responsibilities which the shipowner or 
carrier would not be able to reduce and the maximum exemptions 
which he could not increase. The major maritime powers eventually 
drew up a convention containing such conditions with the recommen­
dation that the conditions be legislatively accepted by the powers con­
cerned. These conditions, or rules, were to become known as the Hague 
Rules, 1921. But to fully appreciate the Rules it is necessary to recog­
nize the liabilities and immunities which a ship owner or carrier 
possessed prior to the Rules.
In shipping there are two types of carriers: the common (or gen­
eral) and the private. By the common law the common carrier is the 
insurer of the goods he carrics with the exception that he shall not be 
liable for loss of or damage to the goods if such is the result of action 
of the King’s enemies, an Act of God due to an inherent vice in the 
goods themselves ( 1 ), or if it is a voluntary sacrificc for the common 
good of all (2). T he common law liabailitv of the private carrier 
is in doubt. There seems to be no authority on the point. W hether 
the private carrier is only liable for loss or damage due to his negligence 
is debateablc. In a dissenting judgment in I.ivcr Alkali Co. v. Johnson, 
(3) Brett. }., felt that private carriers were under a liability recognized 
by the custom of England to carry goods at their absolute liability with 
the same exceptions applicable to them as to the common carrier. 
However in Nugent v. Smith (4) Cockburn, C.J., went out of his wav 
in his obiter dictum to disagree with Brett. I„ and declared that no such 
liability attached to a private carrier. But neither view has binding 
force.
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T he contract for the carriage of goods in the ship is known as 
the contract of affreightment ana may be of two types: charterparty 
or bill of lading. T he charterparty is used where the whole ship is 
contracted for a specific purpose during a specific term at a fixed rate. 
T he bill of lading is used where the snip is put up as a general ship 
and cargo will be accepted from those who wish to ship their goods 
to the ports at which the ship proposes to call.
T he average charterer wishes only to charter the cargo space of 
the vessel: this is a simple charter. T he obligation of the shipowner 
or carrier for goods carried would be set out in the charterparty. 
However, if the charterer wishes to sublet a portion of the cargo space 
a bill of lading would be issued setting forth the conditions under 
which the bill was issued. This bill of lading, as also in the case of 
the general ship, is evidence of the contract to carry goods safely subject 
to tne conditions set out in the bill; also bailment is thereby acknow­
ledged (5). Transferring the bill of lading for value passes the right 
to tne title (as possessed by the transferor) to the property in the cargo 
thereby represented and the right to receive delivery of the cargo at tne
{>ort of discharge. This right remains effective until complete delivery las been made to the perosn holding the bill (6). T he transeferor 
can only pass the rights which he has himself. There must also be the 
intention to so pass these rights as well as the intention on the part of 
the transferee to accept them (7). A transfer may be accomplished 
by delivery, or indorsement and delivery. In Canada the Bills of 
Lading Act vests the right of action in the transferee as if the “contract 
contained in the bill o f lading had been made with himself” (8).
Three conditions which every shipowner or carrier must observe 
arc implied by common law to exist in every contract for the carriage 
of goods by sea unless there are express stipulations to the contrary. 
These conditions are that the ship is seaworthy, that the ship shall com­
mence and carry out the voyage contractcd for with reasonable diligence, 
and that there shall not be unecessary deviations during the voyage (9). 
If these conditions are not observed and the commercial purpose of the 
voyage defeated, the shipper can repudiate the contract. If the breach 
does not defeat the purpose, action for damages can alone arise. Of 
these conditions mention will be made only of seaworthiness.
T he warranty that the ship is seaworthy is absolute. It is not 
that the shipowner or carrier will do his best to make the ship seaworthy; 
it is that the ship is reasonably fit in all respects to carry the cargo to its 
destination safely, bearing in mind the conditions which can be reason­
ably anticipated on such a voyage. The ship should be in a fit state 
as to repair, equipment and crew, and in all other respects, to encounter
(5) R ussian  S team  N av igation  Co. v. S ilva, (1863) 13 C.B. (N .S.) 610
(6) B a rb e r  v. M ejrerste in , 39 L .J .C .P . 187
(7) S ew ell v. B u rd ick , (1884) 10 A pp. Cas. 74 (H .L.)
(8) R .S.C . 1927. c. 17, S2
( 9) S c ru tto n  on C h a r te rp a rtie s  and  Bill* of L ad ing , 13th Ed., p. 96
: s U.  N.  B. L A W  J O U R N A L
the ordinary perils of the voyage (10). Therefore a latent defect could 
be a breach of this warranty although careful inspection could not reveal 
the defect (11). Carver in his book “Carriage by Sea” considers the 
problem of seaworthiness:
“ .... the duty to supply a seaworthy ship is not equivalent
to a duty to provide one that is pcrfcct, and such as cannot 
break down except under extraordinary peril. W h at is 
m eant is that she must have that degree of fitness which an 
ordinary, careful and prudent owner would require his 
vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, having 
regard to all probable circumstances of it. To that extent....
the shipowner....undertakes absolutely that she is fit, and
ignorance is no excuse. If the defect existed the question 
to be put is- W ould a prudent shipowner have required that 
it should be made good before sending his ship to sea had 
he known of it? If lie would have, the ship is not sea­
worthy within the meaning of the undertaking.” ( 1 2 )
Seaworthiness also includes cargo worthiness. The ship must 
be fit to rcccivc the cargo. Such fitness depends upon the quality 
and type of cargo and the anticipated duration of the period of carriage. 
The stowage of the cargo itself, although negligently done, cannot 
amount to unscawort-uncss unless the safety of the ship is thereby 
endangered (13). If the stowage docs not create unscaworthincss 
it is merely a case of bad stowage and will give rise to damages.
W hen the ship has left its moorings with no intention of re­
turning it has entered a new stage (14). Iliere is an implied warranty 
of seaworthiness at the beginning of this new stage. If the ship is 
unfit to encounter expected perils, although it may have been completely 
seaworthy whilst it was King in the loading port taking cargo, the 
warranty is broken (1>). On the completion of one stage the ship 
must have the degree of fitness which is required for the next stage. 
The conccption of stages is marked by different physical conditions, 
the exact limits of whicn arc impossible to define. T he determination 
of a stage and the commencement of a new stage w ill depend upon the 
circumstances; the location of the ship, nature of the cargo, and the 
duration of the antiujv.t :-d voyage. To illustrate: it is not a breach of 
warranty to star! a \o\a:;c without enough fuel for the entire trip, but 
if this is done there i.im t be enough fuel to complete the first stage 
and for refueling and so on with the different stages. To do otherwise 
cannot be excepted under am clause of ncgligcncc on the part of 
master or crcwr in running the ship. If the ship so set out there would 
be a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness (16). There is, however,
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no warranty that seaworthiness will remain during the stage. If from 
any cause the ship later becomes unseaworthy resulting in loss or 
damage to the cargo the shipowner or carrier would be liable only 
if the cause was one for which he was answerable. If the ship is dam­
aged by perils of the sea, the shipowner or carrier need not repair the 
snip. But if the ship is not repaired it cannot proceed on the voyage 
as it is then entering a new phase in an unseaworthy condition (17).
If the implied condition of seaworthiness is broken before the 
commencement of the performance of the contract, either party to it 
may declare it void. If, however, the unseaworthiness is discovered 
after the commencement, the only remedy is damages for actual loss 
or damage caused by the unseaworthiness. If the damage is caused by 
anothed peril, which is not associated with the unseaworthiness, the 
shipowner or carrier may rely on an exception clause for protection, 
if he can so bring himself within it. H e cannot do this if  the cargo 
is damaged in consequence of the unseaworthiness even though tne 
immediate cause thereof may be an expected peril (18).
If a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness is to be relied upon, 
the plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case that the ship was 
unseaworthy at the commencement of a stage. Once this is snown 
the shipowner or carrier must then prove that in fact the vessel was 
seawortny. If the shipowner or carrier does show that the vessel was 
seaworthy he will then have to show that the damage or loss was caused 
by one of the excepted perils in order to relieve himself of liability.
From the foregoing it is to be observed that when the common 
carrier or general ship receives goods to be carried for rew aidit is implied 
at common law, in tne absence of an express contract, that he shall carry 
and deliver the goods safely, subject to the four exceptions above men­
tioned. These are common law exceptions and cannot be relied upon 
if the shipowner or carrier has not taken reasonable care to avoid the 
danger (19) or if he has not provided a seaworthy vessel at the com­
mencement of the voyage.
“Excepted perils” have been mentioned above. Since the com­
mon law gave certain rights to, and imposed liabilities upon, the ship­
owner or carrier, he attem pted to better his position by stipulations 
in the ront«a®k4|aU ith<^m ipper to exempt him  from liability. The 
shipowner orcarneW W 0 ^ a a  to use due diligence in respect of the 
** excepted perils in caring for the safety of the goods carried (20). The
excepted peril was relied upon when the shipper proved that his goods 
had not been delivered or had been delivered damaged. The carrier 
would attem pt to show that the loss or damage was caused by the 
excepted peril; that the excepted peril was the direct and dominant
(17) W orm s v. S to rey , (1855» I I  Ex. 427
(18» The Europm, 1908 P. 84
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cause, (2 1 ) and not the remote cause. The growth of the excepted 
clauses was rap,id until there existed little liability on the part of the 
shipowner or carrier (22).
Kxccptcd perils in chartcrpartics were unobjectionable because 
decreased liabilities enabled shipowners to carry freight at a lower rate. 
The charterer had plenty of time to acquaint himself with the terms 
of the contract. This was not true of the bill of lading. It was passed 
freely from hand to hand as part of the currency of trade, conferring 
on its holder both rights and liabilities. It was of the utmost import­
ance to trade that the bill of lading should pass freely and 
quickly. Eventually consignees for value who had no control over 
tlic terms agreed upon, became interested in the bill of lading not 
having had the opportunity of examining it to ascertain its true value and 
the sccuritv enbodied therein. Too infrequently such consignees 
found that ship owners and carriers were under no liability for loss of or 
damage to cargo. The bill <>t lading in so main cases was nothing but 
a useless piece of paper. \ \  ith the turn of the twentieth century the 
need of legislation to control the extent to which the shipowner or 
carrier could protect himself against loss of or damage to the goods in 
his bailment was most pronounccd. T he situation threatened the use 
of the bill of lading in the business world.
In 1893, the Congress of the United States of Amcrica passed what 
was commonly known as the Harter Act. T he purpose of the act was 
to make it unlawful for a shipowner or carrier to contract for certain 
exemptions from liability and to provide in favour of the shipowner 
or carricr certain statutory exemptions. T he act applied to all con­
tracts made in the U.S.A. and to any consignments entering that 
country.
In 1910 the Canadian parliament, influenced by the Harter Act, 
the Australian enactment of 1904 and the dire need in trade for statutory 
contiol, enacted the W ater-Carriage of Goods Act (23). Bv section 
-1 of (he act certain clauses in bills of lading yvhicli exempted ship­
owners or ihcir servants fiom liabiht\ for certain acts were prohibited 
and any attem pt to extend such exemption made illegal. Section 
6 abolished the absolute warranty of seaworthiness and compelled the 
shipowner to “exercise vine diligence to make the ship in all respects 
scayvorthy. Section ~ hstt I c iicivnstanccs of losses for which the 
shipowner would not be i :'l)le. The \c t was to apply to cargo on 
ships carried from any Canadian port.
In 1921 the major maritime powers agreed upon yvhat yvcrc to 
become known as the Hague Rules. These Rules yvcrc presented as 
a standard with the recommendation that maritime countries should 
legislatively accept them. In 1924 the English parliament did incorp-
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orate the Rules in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In 1936 a sim­
ilar enactm ent was placed on the Canadian statute books (24) which re­
pealed the 1910 act and its subsequent amendments. T he desired 
effect of the 1936 act was to have a stereotyped series of clauses forming 
part of all contracts of affreightment controlling rights and liabilities 
of the parties regardless of their wishes.
Sections 2 and 5 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936 
(which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act) provides th a t the 
Act shall affect only the bill of lading “or similar document of title” 
on outgoing cargoes whether the destination is another Canadian port 
or not. By Section 4 the Rules as set out in the Schedule are to  be con­
sidered part of the bill of lading and are to be so expressed within 
the bill of lading. By Article V the Rules are not applicable 
to charterparties, bu t the article stipulates that “if bills of lading are 
issued in the ease of a ship under a charterpartv, they shall comply 
with the terms of these Rules.” W here third parties have acquired 
possession of bills of lading for value which are documents of title in 
' property and not just evidence of a contract between shipowner and 
charterer, the Rules as set out in the Act will apply. By Article V I the 
Rules shall not apply to goods covered by a non-negotiable receipt 
marked as such, provided tne shipments are not “ordinary commercial 
shipments made in the ordinary course of trade.” By Section 5 Can­
adian coasting trade is not bound by the Rules if the cargo, regardless 
of its nature, is covered by a non-negotiable receipt, marked as such. 
The Rules apply to the type of cargo as set out in Article I; the  mean­
ing of cargo or “goods,” does not apply to live animals nor to deck 
cargo so carried.
"The common law obligation to provide a seaworthy ship for 
the cargo is abolished by the Act in Section 3. By Article III, 
Rule 1 the carrier is obliged to use onlv “due diligence” that the ship 
be seaworthy “before” and “ at the beginning” of the voyage. This 
due diligence on the part of the carrier, as well as the other minimum 
responsibilities set out in the Rules, cannot be lessened, and any attem pt 
to do so would be “null and void and of no effect” by virtue of Article 
III, Rule 8. The obligation to exercise due diligence applies also to 
servants and agents of the carrier (25).
There is a difference of opinion as to whether or not this legis­
lative obligation to use due diligence to provide a seaworthy snip 
“before” and “at the beginning” of the voyage has done away with the 
doctrine of “stages.” Scrutton L.J. seems to be of the opinion th a t it has, 
because now, provided the shipowner or carrier has aone all he is re­
quired to do ‘ before” and “at the beginning” of the voyage, any sub­
sequent act would be neglect or default in the navigation or manage-
(24) T he  C arriag e  of G oods by  S ea A ct, 1936, R .S.C. 1 Ed. VIII c. 49
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mcnt of the ship, on the- part of the master or the carrier's servants 
which is excepted by Article IN', Rule 2 (a). (26). But Chorlcx and 
Giles state:—
"... it always seems most reasonable to argue that without 
express xxords the Act cannot be taken to have abolished 
the doctrine of stages in connection with the contracts 
to which it applies.” (27)
Further, thcx state that the obligation imposed by Article III, Rule 2 
is not to be cut down bx am protection given bx Article IV, Rule 2(a) 
and referred to a House of Lords case to justify this belief (28).
Rule 1 of Article III continues to provide that the carrier shall 
use due diligence to “properly man, equip, and supply the ship” and 
prox idc proper cargo holds according to the cargo to be shipped aboard. 
Rule 2 provides for the complete handling of the cargo, subject to 
Article IV, from the time it is accepted until it is discharged at its 
consignment port.
T he naximum exemptions which the carrier cannot increase 
are found in Articlc IV. Under Rule 1 the carrier is absolved from 
liability for loss of or damage to the cargo which results from unsca- 
worthincss but not for want of due diligence on the part of the carricr, 
his servants or agents. In other words the carricr is responsible for 
negligence in not exercising due diligence. Scrutton L.J. feels little 
is gained bx the shipowner under this rule:
“ .... if the xcssel is unseaworthy due diligence cannot liaxe
been used by the owner, his scrxants or agents; if due 
diligence has been used the xcssel in fact xxill be sea­
worthy.” (29)
The only time the shipowner would gain relief would be in the 
case of a latent defect, but under Rule Z(p) of Article IV an express 
exception is “latent dcfccts not discoxcred by due diligence.” Tlicrc- 
forc Scrutton L.J. feels the “due diligence" clause of Rule 1 ]>osscsscs 
no improvement for the carricr which is not covered by the later Rule. 
W ith  this view MacLachlan J. agrees. (30)
T he second portion of Rule 1 of Articlc lY  casts the onus on 
the carrier or any other person claiming exemption under this section 
to prove that due diligence xvas exercised xxhen tnc loss or damage results 
from unseaworthiness. The consignee has but to shoxv that his goods 
xxcrc damaged xxhen delivered, or never delivered, and the onus is cast 
upon the cauicr to prove that due diligence xvas exercised as required 
by the statute. Once the carrier has proved that he used due diligence 
to make the ship scaxvorthy he xxill be obliged to show that the damage 
or loss resulted from an excepted peril, in order to protect himself. 
This excepted peril must also be the causa causans, or causa proxima, 
and not just a causa sine qua non.
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Rule 2(a) of Articlc IV  provides that the carrier shall not be 
responsible for any loss of or damage to cargo which results from the 
the “act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants 
of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.” 
T he Courts have construed this clause strictly against the shipowner 
and have expressed reluctance to extend the clause beyond its clear 
meaning. The difficulty arises from the fact that many things are 
done on a ship which nave no connection with “the navigation” or 
“the management of the ship.” The onlv act, neglect, or default 
which is covered by the exception is that which relates directly to the 
safety' of the vessel. Any act, neglect, or default which directly or 
indirectly relates to the care of the cargo and not to the ship is not 
covered by the rule. T he rule applies from the moment tne cargo 
is accepted until it is discharged at the port of consignment. Tne 
main difficulty lies of course in what is meant by “navigation” and 
“management.”
In the case of The Glenochil (31), the engineer in an attem pt 
to secure stability pumped water into the ballast tanks without inspect­
ing them. The result was leakage through a broken tank and 
damage to the cargo. T he Court decided tne act was done in the 
management of the ship, although negligently done. The intention 
was to care for the safety of the vessel and not connected in any way 
with the cargo. If there is mismanagement in the care of the cargo 
although it involves using part of the ship for such care, and damage 
results, there can be no claim that there was mismanagement in the 
care of the ship (32). Every act on the ship does not always relate to 
the ship as a whole. The outstanding English case on this problem 
is Gosse Millard, Ltd. v. Canadian Government M erchant M arine Ltd. 
(33). Here the ship carricd a cargo of tinplates subject to the Rules. 
During the voyage the ship sustained damage and put into dock 
for repairs. W orkmen entered by means of the hatches of the 
hold where the tinplates were stowed. T he hatches were not prop­
erly covered and rainwater entered. Damage resulted to the tin­
plates. The carrier declared that the damage resulted in the man­
agement of the ship. The Court held that tne negligence had noth­
ing to do with the management of the ship. To hold otherwise 
would involve an improper use of language the Court declared. This 
was clearly negligence in not caring for the cargo as required by Article 
III, Rule 2. Nothing would be left of the obligation to carc for the 
cargo as required if the Court had not decided as it did. W hat is 
management of the ship is a question of fact in each case. The 
exception provided by Article IV, Rule 2(a) is a general negligence 
exception but as there are words of positive obligation subject to these 
words of exception, the presumption always is that the obligation 
is greater than the exception. As pointed out by MacLachlan J. the
(31) (1896) P . 10
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test is: (i) was it done in the proper handling of the ship as a ship, 
even though it was done negligently? or (ii) was it simply a failure 
on the part of the carrier to fulfill’ the obligation of caring for the 
cargo? (H)
The rest of Rule 2 contains the exceptions in ease of fire, perils 
of the sea. Act of God. etc. Some of these are the old common law 
exceptions, while the others arc embodied in the Act with the con­
ception of equitable protection for the earricr. T he last clause is the 
general clause: “am other cause arising without the actual fault or 
privity of the carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the agents or 
servants of the carrier” (3S). The first three words arc very general; 
thcv arc not intended to give protection against all risks. They arc 
to be interpreted as being cjusdcm generis with the previous except­
ions set out provided a genus can be found. The cjusdcm generis 
rule provides that where special words arc followed and amplified by 
general words the latter arc to be confined in their application to things 
of the same genus as the prccccding specific words. Here, however, 
it is difficult to find a genus wide enough to cover the exceptions. 
Therefore it might seem sufficient if the carrier were to show that 
the loss or damage was not due to his negligence even though he could 
not show the exact cause of the loss. As set out by the section the 
onus of disproving negligence rests with the parts claiming exemption 
under the section.
Leaving Rule 2 of Article IV, which is by far the most interesting, 
it will be noted that the Act has numerous other beneficial rules for 
both earricr and shipper. The carrier cannot be responsible for the 
loss of or damage to cargo which results from reasonable deviations 
in an attem pt to save life or property (36); nor can the carrier be re­
sponsible for over a certain sum per unit in ease of loss or damage unless 
the value be declared (3~); nor is the carrier responsible for destroying 
dangerous goods unless they be accepted as such (38); and a shipper is 
not responsible for any loss or damage sustained b\ the carrier unless 
caused by the act. fault, or neglect on the part of the shipper, his 
agents or servants (39).
l'hc bill of lading, which is so vital in the world of commcrcc 
and finance, is thus covered by the Act in the aspects therein set out. 
Commerce has guaranteed that although the holder of the bill of lading 
acquires no better title than his jvcdcccssor in title in spite of the 
consignee being a bona fide holder for value, the consignee will be 
aware of the minimum responsibilities and liabilities imposed upon 
the carrier as well as the maximum exemptions which cannot be altered
(34 1 S u p ra , p. 378
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cxccpt against the interest of the carrier (40). Consequently the bill 
of lading can pass fveclv and quickly with the guarantee of protection 
to those concerned, 'lliis, as pointed out, applies to cargoes outward 
bound from a Canadian port, and, also it should be added, to cargoes 
inward bound from another country which likewise has legislatively 
accepted the Hague Rules.
M ight it not be wise to have the Rules apply to all incoming 
cargoes as well as outgoing? It is agrued that to attem pt to have such 
an application would be an attem pt to impose Canatlaian legislation 
upon a contract made outside of Canada; the only connection with 
Canada is that it is the ultimate destination of the subject m atter of 
the contract. But would it be so unreasonable to argue that once the 
subject m atter or the title to the subject m atter has come within Can­
adian jurisdiction the Rules as set out in the Act should then attach 
to the contract? There seems to be no real objection. Many ship­
ments come to Canada from foreign countries which do not statutorily 
recognize the Hague Rules. It is the consignee in the Canadian con­
signment port who should be protected by the Rules; why not apply 
the Act to all incoming as well as outgoing shipments regardless of 
where the contract of affreightment is drawn up.
(40) A rtic le  V
W allace D. Macaulay
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